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Editors' Comments
ON READERS’ COMMENTS
THIS IS just a brief editorial note to thank those few readers who 
responded to my appeal to write to the journal indicating just 
what they want it to contain. If there was a poor response, this 
does not mean that mass apathy is to blame. As revolutionaries, 
we must always look to ourselves and the inadequacies of our 
methods to seek the reasons for our lack of success and then we 
must modify our policies. Only then is it possible for us to 
blame the mass for their apathy or their quietism. What the few 
letters I did receive indicated was readers’ irritation with the 
number of theoretical pieces which were difficult to understand 
and with the imbalance between reports about Australian issues 
and overseas issues. They want more Australian content.
I, personally, am dubious about eliminating sections on theory, 
for this is to lapse into populism and to forget Lenin’s famous 
dictum that “Without a revolutionary theory, there can be no 
revolutionary movement” . It is in my opinion, and I look forward 
to correction from my readers, that much of the failure of the 
socialist revolutionary movement in Australia can be ascribed, 
to lack of an adequate grasp of theory, not to a lack of militancy, 
though it may be that that too is disappearing today as “One 
Dimensionality” supersedes positions of criticism in our society. 
The assertion of Kavanagh that communists should “Go back to 
Marx” before they could make a revolution seems as valid forty 
years after it was made as it was in the late twenties. Simply, I 
am not in favour of reducing the amount of space devoted to 
theoretical issues.
However, I believe this journal must recognise the force of 
reader criticism that nearly all theoretical material in this journal 
has been too esoteric —  in fact, so difficult to understand that 
they have not even read it. In future, I  think, the journal should 
exercise a rigorous editorial policy of demanding that all articles 
on theory be written in a way that can be understood by the 
general reader. If the material cannot be presented in such a 
lucid fashion as to be understood by all, then it should not appear. 
Moreover, it is arguable, against the mystifiers of marxism, that 
Marx intended all his work to be understood by the workers, and 
ccrtainly was intensely hostile to the meanderings of philosophers. 
We can even go so far as to assert that marxism is common sense 
raised to the level of philosophy.
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Outraged sophisticates of marxism should recall, before taking up 
cudgels, that Marx himself was always very careful to  point out 
that no idea became real as a social force until it was taken up 
by the mass of people. The purveyors of theory should therefore 
take especial pains, when writing for this journal, to make their 
points simply enough and to use simple enough language for their 
argument to be understood by the mass of its readers.
Reader demand that there be more concentration on Australian 
issues is a point well taken. Henceforth this journal will make 
the most energetic efforts to become more Australian in content. 
It will need to draw on the resources of more and different writers
—  people who are knowledgeable on matters Australian. This 
increased emphasis on Australian matters will not mean the 
complete elimination of reports on overseas matters, but it will 
mean more regular reports on Australian economics, Australian 
imperialism, Australian foreign policy and on Australian racism. 
We look forward to receiving material from readers on these issues.
A.D.
THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT. WHERE NOW?
In a relatively short space of time all the old debates about the 
Vietnam war have ended. Nobody enters the debates any more to 
speak of “threats from the north”, the “menace of China” , or 
“saving Vietnam for democracy” . Even our obligations to great 
and powerful friends hardly rate a mention in the media. One 
might conclude that the anti-war forces have won the debate, which, 
in a certain sense, they have, but to leave the matter there is to 
assume that we have also won our “war” , which we have not. It 
is just too early to pack up our demonstration kits and go home.
The temporary difficulties experienced by the Liberal-Country 
Party in adjusting their line to the new emphases in United States 
policies may afford some satisfaction to those who have opposed 
the Vietnam war and supported normal relations with the Peoples 
Republic of China, but satisfaction should not delude us into an 
assumption that anything basic has changed.
Why is there so little debate? Obviously silence is a tactical 
refuge for the government. A debate assumes that two sides 
contend. When one lapses into silence the sharpness of the other 
may be blunted or turned in on itself. The pro-war forces do not 
want a debate, even the old debates were forced onto them, 
because they want people to believe that the problems have all 
been resolved. Above all they hope to delude the anti-war forces 
into believing that there is nothing now to worry about. If the 
combat troops are withdrawn in a suitably emotional atmosphere —
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bring the boys home for Christmas —  who will notice that the 
training and advisory personnel are to remain? Who will believe 
that it is such troops, American and Australian commanders, 
experts and technicians who will continue to run the war, using 
local puppet troops, against the independence movement of the 
Vietnamese people? And if people do believe there is still a 
problem won’t the United States and China fix it up together?
All that is left (the government hopes) is conscription, always 
the lesser question in the mass actions against the Vietnam war 
anyway, and who will worry over much if the conscripts do not 
have to do Vietnam service, especially if the term of service is 
cut back by six months? It is the anti-war movement which 
needs the debate to counter the confidence tricks, to avoid confusion 
which would lead to immobility, and to extend the movement. 
Right now, at the level of the media, a public debate just isn’t 
on while within the movement the debate tends to turn in on 
itself. An important exception has been the debate that has 
been taken up in workshops. Workers who still maintain the 
arguments once advanced by a Gorton or a McMahon have begun 
to confront the issues with anti-war activists. The results have 
been positive and found reflection in the increased stopwork actions 
against the war on June 30th.
But the issues were, and are now, more complex and not easily 
conveyed in a lunch break or, for that matter, a university front 
lawn meeting. The movement has to estimate that while mass 
demonstrations against the war have continued to grow mass 
consciousness has not greatly increased. Certainly sentiment 
against the war is broad but because it is not very deep it can be 
suborned in the changing situation. It does not help much if 
the left debates with itself, often confining its arguments to such 
questions as the dates and routes of demonstrations or that ration 
of speakers and rock bands considered to be most suitable for 
the cars of the demonstrators.
And the left, in large degree, continues to project itself simplis- 
tically. creating an impression that the key to the problem of 
consciousness about the nature of Australian foreign policy lies 
in telling people long and loud that the Vietnam war is a major 
part of the global strategy of US imperialism. That there is no 
easy solution, no simple answer and certainly no particular form 
of propaganda to solve this problem, has to be faced. A comparison 
between anti-war material issued in various States would rate 
Adelaide highest on one form of anti-imperialist propaganda yet 
it would be rash to assume that mass consciousness is higher 
there than elsewhere.
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The movement was built, and should continue to be mobilised, 
on the demand for immediate and total withdrawal. It should not 
settle for less. The partial withdrawals should be assessed as a 
partial victory but insufficient to justify a contract out of 
responsibility in favour of government promises, big power settle­
ments or the hope of a future Labor Government. In addition 
to army commanders and advisers, the government intends to keep 
intelligence personnel, navy units, some RAAF units and RAAF 
men engaged with the US Airforce in Vietnam for as long as they 
are allowed. Those who seek to step back from the demand for 
immediate and total withdrawal should note that McMahon was 
quoted in The Australian on July 29th, 1971, saying: “Total 
Allied withdrawal would not solve the Vietnam problem” .
The exact nature of a changing relationship between China and 
the United States is open to speculation and not easy to estimate. 
No one should quarrel with China’s wish to normalise relations 
with particular countries, to improve trade, to win even tacit 
consent that Taiwan is not a separate nation and to end, or 
minimise, the costly isolation imposed mainly, but not entirely, 
through imperialist policies. At the same time it would be foolish 
for the anti-war movement in this country to now assume that 
the United States, or Nixon, has suddenly become rational and 
generous, or by implication, McMahon. Heavily pressed at home 
by a growing anti-war movement which now includes considerable 
sections in the ranks of the armed forces, it may well suit Nixon 
to play at peace making while bargaining in other ways for the 
stakes of Vietnam. It is not unlikely that Japan will, as she can, 
shoulder much more of the military burden for imperialism in 
Asia. This, together with some troop withdrawals from Vietnam, 
can be used to buy off some of the movement. More importantly, 
Nixon has been seeking an international conference to settle the 
Indo-China conflict.
McMahon, again playing internal politics, treated with scant 
attention Whitlam’s telegram from China announcing his belief 
that a new Geneva style conference could be called in 1972. 
Certainly the idea is being floated and whether in response to 
such speculation or not, it is important to note that the Vietnamese 
liberation forces have recently made explicit statements affirming 
that Vietnam’s future must be determined by the Vietnamese and 
not by anyone else. After long years of successful struggle they 
will not negotiate away the positions they have won, and the 
United States has lost, in battle.
Nevertheless there is a view in the movement that Vietnam may 
now be facing pressures which could materially affect her fighting
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capacity. Such a view adds strength to the idea that, in the long 
run, big powers determine everything but it is not well founded 
whatever impression Whitlam may have received in China in May. 
An official Chinese statement, early in August, ridiculed the 
concept of an international conference and reaffirmed that the 
condition for settlement in Indo-China is total, immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of United States troops. The one hard 
fact that emerges for both the American and Australian movements 
is that by forcing the total withdrawal of the military presence of 
the imperialists from Vietnam we could put Vietnam beyond 
compromise, real or imagined. While recognising that both big 
and little powers, under threat, are sometimes forced to make 
compromises our aim should be to avoid those compromises of 
our demands which would, in any way, legitimise the presence of 
any of our troops in Indo-China.
The condition for the greater mobilisation of the anti-war forces 
is the reopening of the public debate throughout every section of 
the community and the extension of the debate so that it embraces 
the nature of Australia’s foreign policy and the meaning of the 
present changes. The fact is that, in addition to the forces that 
will remain in Vietnam, strong Australian ground, sea and air 
forces are stationed in Malaysia, Singapore and Papua-New Guinea. 
In all cases they are there for the same reason as in Vietnam —  to 
destroy by force the democratic movements of the local people, 
for true independence and freedom from the exploitation of 
Australian, British, Japanese and American capital. Even though 
it may shift some troops from one place to another, the Australian 
Government, like the United States, is aiming to continue its real 
policy in Asia —■ armed intervention, using conscript soldiers to 
maintain its imperialist power.
The situation requires the continuance of a genuine national 
anti-Avar coalition which can promote the public debate while 
developing significant national mass actions involving all areas of 
the coalition and extending further into the organised work force. 
Ail these elements are essential if mass consciousness on the real 
issues of Vietnam is to be deepened and not dissipated. The 
movement will be impeded to the extent that the coalition, now 
expressed in the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign, continues to be 
turned into an organisation responsible for every facet of the 
movement. Such a form substitutes for, and ultimately curtails, 
the initiatives of each component part of the movement and subjects 
it both to the risk of take-over bids and co-option into respectability 
by those who give first priority to a parliamentary solution.
M.R.
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